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Are advanced democracies converging on a liberalized economic model, revolving around in-
creasing penetration of markets and the decline of egalitarian institutions (Baccaro and Howell 2011)? 
An extensive literature has examined institutional change in the advanced industrialized economies, 
examining the impact of Europeanization, globalization and other structural economic changes on the 
different models of welfare capitalism found in the OECD countries. This debate has tended to polarize 
between proponents of convergence, who argue that common pressures push advanced democracies to 
adopt similar policies and institutions, and scholars who emphasize the resilience of the distinct mod-
els of welfare capitalism that evolved in the industrial age, although some recent scholarship seeks to 
bridge this divide. At the same time, there is increasingly firm evidence that the distribution of income 
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in advanced democracies is becoming more unequal, sparking a lively debate on how inequality can be 
measured and explained (OECD 2011).
This article seeks to contribute to this literature by examining changes to the political economy 
of labour in two large European democracies: Italy and the United Kingdom. Though infrequently com-
pared by political economists, Italy and the UK offer a useful vantage point for observing the nature 
and consequences of institutional change in the advanced democracies. Despite belonging to entirely 
distinct “families” of welfare capitalism, they have both undergone extensive changes to their politi-
cal economy in the past three decades. Whilst these changes have differed in many ways, the result in 
both cases has been a steady shift from being relatively egalitarian societies to having the highest levels 
of income inequality in Western Europe. By charting these changes, we aim to offer insights into the 
nature and implications of institutional change in the advanced democracies. We find that Italy and the 
UK were very different political economies in the 1970s, and remain very different today, but they have 
both undertaken reforms which have weakened egalitarian institutions and led to dramatic increases 
in poverty and inequality. This suggests that a focus on the diversity of institutional legacies and the 
distinct reform paths that we observe in advanced democracies should not distract from the conclusion 
that market-focused economic reforms in very different institutional contexts can still lead to the same 
outcome: the privatization of economic risk and increased income inequality.
II. Convergence, Divergence and Institutional Change in Western Europe
Over the past two decades an extensive literature has examined the impact of the twin forces of 
Europeanization and globalization on the distinctive institutions of welfare capitalism found in Western 
Europe. Proponents of the “convergence” thesis argue that a variety of forces external to the nation state 
push advanced democracies to adopt a more similar set of institutional arrangements. Opponents of this 
view stress the myriad forces of institutional divergence amongst advanced states, suggesting that this 
divergence is robust to outside pressures, and that continued diversity is the most likely outcome. These 
different approaches are generally founded on distinct theoretical premises, and make recognizably 
different empirical predictions about the state of the world. A range of empirical studies has attempted, 
using quantitative techniques such as regression or factor analysis, to gauge the extent of convergence. 
Conversely, the divergence school often bases its arguments on more detailed qualitative empirical 
analysis of single cases, or small n comparisons, which usually show the difficulties involved in institu-
tional change and the persistence of national differences, stressing a lack of significant change over time.
Theories of convergence focus on two main exogenous factors: globalization and Europeanization. 
Globalization exposes advanced countries to ever greater competition, undermining national economic 
institutions that protect society from the downside of markets and unleashing a “race to the bottom” as 
governments abandon generous welfare states and strict regulatory regimes (Marquand 1994, Strange 
1996, Bouget 2003). In labour markets, this means a generalised push towards dismantling employment 
protection regimes, which are seen as inimical to “competitiveness” and efficient clearing of job markets 
(Siebert 1997), and reducing income protection entitlements (Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991, OECD 
1994). Although the direst predictions of the damage to welfare regimes proved overblown (Garrett 1998, 
Drezner 2001, Swank 2002), there is cumulative evidence that the last two-three decades have seen a 
strong trend towards liberalization reforms in advanced economies (Baccaro and Howell 2011). 
European integration acts as a force for convergence both through its explicit regulatory require-
ments and through the increasing economic openness constituted by the single European market (Ferrera 
and Gualmini 2004, Hay 2006, Hay and Wincott 2012). Europeanization also takes other forms beyond 
regulation and competition (Radaelli 2000, Zeitlin et al. 2005, Graziano and Vink 2008, Exadaktylos 
and Radaelli 2010); for example, the adoption of European level initiatives in employment policy in the 
framework of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) gives member states an incentive to evaluate 
policy according to shared criteria (Lodge 2002, Hopkin and Wincott 2006). Here, rather than a simple 
deregulation of labour markets, proponents of convergence see the likely outcome as a common move 
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towards a more flexible but protected labour force on the “flexicurity” model (Sapir 2006). The main 
policy template of interest here is the European Employment Strategy (Ashiagbor 2005), which drew 
on “best practice” in mostly Northern European countries to propose labour market reforms combining 
liberalization and flexibility with social cohesion and social investment (Morel, Palier and Palme 2011).
In spite of all these powerful forces for convergence, economic policies and institutions remain 
stubbornly diverse amongst advanced democracies. Two main approaches can be invoked to explain this 
diversity. Paul Pierson’s “New Politics” of the welfare state (2001) stressed the resilience of institutions, 
which lock in particular patterns of behaviour and generate protective coalitions, undermining reform 
attempts. Even though the forces of convergence may be “irresistible”, the welfare state is an “immov-
able object” (Pierson 1998), so radical changes in response to the pressures for convergence —such 
as reductions in employment protection and the dismantling of corporatist institutions— are unlikely. 
Second, the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach (Hall and Soskice 2001, Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher 
2007) stresses that divergence is also functional, since different kinds of production regimes can be 
equally efficient in responding to external economic pressures. Globalization should not lead to con-
vergence around a liberal market model, because Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) can resolve 
coordination problems just as effectively as Liberal Market Economies (LMEs). In labour markets, this 
implies that established levels of employment protection and wage protection will tend to complement 
other features of the political economy (bolstering skill formation and wage moderation, for example), 
making radical change unlikely because “actors (…) face incentives to preserve the existing system of 
coordination” (Hancké, Rhodes and Thatcher 2007: 12). For instance, coordinated labour markets are 
complementary to other economic institutions and contribute to economic performance. 
These logics of institutional persistence are powerful and important, but existing models are under 
serious pressure to reform as shown by recent research which rejects the idea of welfare states as “frozen 
landscapes” in which the only interesting questions revolve around retrenchment and restraint (Hemerijck 
2008). This kind of approach offers a more dynamic view of European welfare state change, focusing 
on patterns of welfare “recalibration” (Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes 2003), which are constrained by 
institutional legacies, but which can still result in substantial change. Even apparent institutional stability 
and continuity can mask radical change, when existing institutions are “displaced” by new ones, allowed 
to “drift” in the face of new challenges, or “converted” to new functions (Hacker 2004: 246-8, Streeck 
and Thelen 2005: 18-30, also Hacker 2002, Thelen 2003, 2006). Moreover, distinct national patterns of 
institutional change may still produce convergent results, as countries choose different routes to adopting 
increasingly market-oriented arrangements (Streeck 2009, Baccaro and Howell 2011). 
There is plenty of evidence that European welfare states have undergone significant change in 
the 1990s and 2000s, revising old policy programmes and introducing new ones, blending and experi-
menting old instruments and paradigms with innovative policy contents, emulating and borrowing ideas 
from other national experiences or from supranational agendas. The economic and social challenges of 
this period (the demographic revolution, the entry of the women in the labour market, the openness of 
markets and de-industrialization) and the related appearance of new social risks, particularly affecting 
the weakest categories of the labour market (Taylor-Gooby 2004, Armingeon and Bonoli 2006, Palier 
and Martin 2008), have had a destabilizing effect on national welfare states. Pressures to adopt the 
Anglo-American model as a “one best prescription” (Mukand and Rodrik 2005) on the one hand, and the 
influence of EU directives on the other, have interacted with national institutional legacies in a variety 
of ways, creating a confusing picture. 
The diversity of policy prescriptions – from Anglo-American liberalism to Nordic social invest-
ment strategies —and the complexity of diverse national traditions, make a simplistic theory of conver-
gence untenable. Even if we accept the importance of international economic and political pressures, 
the institutional legacies and differentially organized social interests of national polities will refract, or 
even absorb, these pressures in significant ways. However, what we also know is that even before the 
financial crisis of the late 2000s, welfare and labour politics were conditioned by a climate of “perma-
nent austerity” (Pierson 1996), and the strains imposed on the labour force by globalization and terti-
arization. The variety of institutional options available to European welfare states may be much greater 
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than early convergence theorists believed, but the outcomes have nevertheless been remarkably similar 
(OECD 2011). This suggests that beneath the complex and diverse nature of the policy process in dif-
ferent countries, powerful political and economic forces are pushing in a common direction (Baccaro 
and Howell 2011). The result is not institutional convergence, but it does reflect a common “direction of 
travel”. Moreover, the process of liberalization inevitably involves some measures which seek to miti-
gate the social costs of pro-market reforms, although these measures appear insufficient to contrast the 
broad thrust of market incursions into social life. So liberalization may be the common underlying trend, 
but it is not a uniform process. In sum, this pattern of labour and welfare policy in European political 
economies can be described as “liberalization within diversity”.
The rest of this article will present some evidence for this interpretation, by comparing welfare 
and labour reforms in Italy and the UK. The selection of cases allows us to assess the “liberalization 
within diversity” thesis. On the one hand, Italy and the UK exhibit two very different forms of welfare 
capitalism, the former a Southern European variant of the “Bismarckian” or “conservative” welfare re-
gime, the latter the clearest European exemplar of a liberal welfare regime. On the other, however, both 
countries have undergone processes of institutional change in their welfare regimes, which have not 
brought convergence, but which have resulted in increasingly similar outcomes for citizens. The article 
proceeds as follows: the next section compares the development of labour markets and social indicators 
in the two countries, charting the liberalizing trends in Italy and the UK, the following sections examine 
in greater depth the reform processes in the UK and Italy in turn, and the final section concludes.
III. Liberalization Within Diversity: Bismarck, Beveridge and the Market
It is well known that Italy and the UK belong to two very different welfare regimes. In the wel-
fare states literature, Italy is a classically “Esping-Andersen’s” system of social protection, the UK a 
“Beveridgean” model; or to use Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds” typology (1990), the former is a 
“continental conservative” welfare regime (for Ferrera 1996, a “Southern European” regime), whilst 
the UK is a “liberal” welfare regime. For the Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001), 
Italy is mostly considered part of the group of “mixed market economies” (MMEs) (Hancké, Rhodes and 
Thatcher 2007), with some features of the Northern European social market model, but also a distinctive 
“statist” inclination, through the use of regulation and state-owned enterprises to coordinate economic 
activity (Hopkin 2006, Schmidt 2009). Britain is the most prominent European exemplar of the “liberal 
market economy” (LME), characterized by competitive relationships between firms and deregulated mar-
kets, although in the past it had some features of an unstable coordinated market economy. Moreover, 
the policymaking context is also very different in the two cases: Italy has historically shown a degree of 
corporatist policy-making and unstable and divided governments, whereas in the UK trade unions have 
been largely excluded from policy processes, and governments are strong and cohesive (Lijphart 1999). 
In spite of these differences, the two countries share a clear trend toward higher levels of poverty 
and inequality since the 1970s, as we can see in Figure 1. The Gini coefficient of post-tax income inequal-
ity for all households grew from somewhere around 0.30 in the early 1980s to around 0.34-0.35 in the 
late 2000s in both countries, with the biggest increases coming during the 1980s and early 1990s, and 
inequality stabilizing after then. Poverty rates also show substantial increases in the same period, as can 
be observed in Figures 2 and 3. Britain and Italy are not unique in experiencing pressures on their social 
cohesion in this period, and there is a well-known set of broader economic and social trends that explain 
the challenge to the more egalitarian post-war order in western democracies (see for example Streeck 
and Thelen 2005, Glyn 2006). But the distributional effects of the new economic order have been more 
powerful in these two cases than in the majority of OECD countries, which make them a valuable source 
of insights into the processes of change facing advanced capitalism since the 1970s.
What makes the comparison of Britain and Italy particularly fruitful is that this growing inequality 
reflects neither their joint convergence on the free market liberal model, nor indeed a simple destruction 
of their welfare and labour market institutions. Instead, the story is more complex. First, the liberaliza-
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Figure 1. Gini Coefficient of Post-tax Household Income mid-1970s to late-2000s, Italy, UK and OECD 
Average.
Source, OECD, 2012.
Figure 2. Pre-tax Poverty Rate (% on less than 50% median income) mid-1970s to late-2000s, Italy, UK and 
OECD Average.
Source, OECD, 2012.
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tion of the labour market has taken a different path in the two cases, given their very different starting 
points. Italy, with a more regulated labour market in the post-war era, has embarked on the privatiza-
tion and decentralization of its job centres, the introduction of a wide range of flexible employment 
contracts and of specific programmes for the activation of the outsiders (the young and the women), and 
the incorporation of more conditional logics into the allocation of unemployment support. In the UK, 
in contrast, labour market protections have always been weaker, and recent reforms have introduced a 
statutory minimum wage, enhanced trade union participation in the workplace, and improved the rights 
of temporary workers, so that before the financial crisis some observers claimed to see a shift to an 
“Anglo-Social” welfare model (Hopkin and Wincott 2006). The changes to labour market regulation 
are shown in Figure 4, which charts the two countries’ measures on the OECD Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) variable over the past two decades. It can be seen that Britain had very low levels of 
formal labour regulation all the way through, whilst Italy has liberalized, converging on the OECD aver-
age, but remains relatively protected by comparison to the UK.
The push towards more liberal arrangements in labour markets has coincided with significant 
changes to welfare policies in both countries. On the one hand, policy drift has brought an increase in 
social spending, in part associated with the aging of the population, which has had particularly powerful 
effects in Italy, which has both less favourable demographics and more public pension provision than in 
the UK. Figure 5 shows that social expenditure on the whole has seen an upward rise in the period under 
study, particularly so in Italy, where state pensions outlays have reached 15% of GDP in the late 2000s. 
But the increase in social spending also reflects in part a response to the increased poverty that has re-
sulted from the growing inequalities in the labour market, persistently high unemployment, and “new 
social risks” associated with changing patterns of family formation and life expectancy. The significant 
differences in poverty rates before and after taxes and benefits (Figures 2 and 3) in both countries shows 
that this social spending has had a powerful impact, but has not come close to arresting the trend towards 
higher inequality and poverty.
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Figure 3. Post-tax Poverty Rate (% on less than 50% median income) mid-1970s to late-2000s, Italy, UK and 
OECD Average.
Source, OECD, 2012.
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Figure 5. Social Expenditure (% GDP), Italy, the UK and OECD, 1980-2007.
Source, OECD, 2012.
Figure 4. Employment Protection Index, Italy, the UK and OECD, 1998-2008.
Source, Online OECD employment database, 2009.
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The emergence of widespread acute poverty and high unemployment as new social risks in Italy 
destabilized the traditional labour market and welfare regime, and elites have responded with a struc-
tural recalibration of existing institutions and policies, largely in a liberalizing direction. In the UK 
meanwhile, the liberalizing reforms of the 1980s were followed in the 1990s by strong pressures to 
redesign the British welfare regime along more “social” lines, apparently emulating a more “European” 
social model. The reforms undertaken before the crisis in both countries were consistent with the policy 
advice of the European Employment Strategy (EES), which has advocated the adoption of both a degree 
of labour market liberalization and the development of a work-oriented “flexicurity” model of social 
protection. However these moves did not go far enough to bring either Italy or the UK particularly close 
to the Nordic “flexicurity” model which inspired the EES.
These two cases provide some leverage for assessing most recent theoretical hypotheses on wel-
fare state reorganization, looking beyond the “usual suspects” to less studied, and even less frequently 
compared, countries. Italy and the United Kingdom are valuable cases because they exhibit very diver-
gent institutional traditions, yet have both introduced policies which challenge their existing institu-
tional logics. These policies have certainly moved them in a liberalizing direction, and the egalitarian 
institutions which upheld the post-war settlement have been severely weakened. At the same time, lib-
eralization has been accompanied by measures, albeit largely insufficient, which respond to the social 
costs of freer markets. The research design is an example of selecting on the dependent variable, but 
this choice is justified by the usefulness of seeing how advanced democracies with different institutional 
histories can follow quite different routes toward a similar outcome: a more marketized economy and 
greater inequality. The next two sections chart the processes of policy change in the two cases in turn.
IV. Liberalization in a Liberal Market Economy: Welfare and Work from Thatcherism to New 
Labour
Esping-Andersen (1990) identified Britain as a “liberal welfare regime” on the basis of 1980 data, 
but most observers agree that it was the Thatcher governments of the 1980s that transformed the UK 
labour market into the “flexible” deregulated model we are familiar with today. A series of legislative 
interventions focused on recalibrating the balance of power in British industrial relations, by removing 
trade union legal immunities, requiring formal balloting of memberships before strike action could be 
taken, outlawing “closed shop” arrangements, and restricting the scope for union strategies such as sec-
ondary action and picketing (Paterson and Simpson 1993, Wood 2001). Interestingly, the Thatcher re-
forms did not bring about a particularly dramatic reduction in employment protection legislation, which 
was already at the lower end of the scale: British workers had relied on trade union strength, rather 
than legislative restrictions, to provide job security. As well as curbing union power, the Conservative 
government also dismantled the wages councils and the minimum wage, freeing up wage determination 
from institutional restraints, and the authorities encouraged —and refused to regulate— the growing 
use of temporary and part-time employment contracts. The end result was that in the early 1990s the 
OECD’s Job Study (1994) identified Britain, along with the US, as models of labour market flexibility 
and pressed other European countries to follow its deregulatory path. 
The other plank of the Thatcherite labour market model was to “roll back” the welfare state, by 
reducing unemployment benefits and cutting taxes, with the aim of incentivizing swift re-entry to the job 
market for those made unemployed. This policy was initially unsuccessful in reducing unemployment, 
and the persistently large numbers of claimants (and threat of social disorder) undermined attempts to 
reduce welfare transfers. Here again, the thrust of policy was to restrict welfare state growth, rather 
than reduce net provision, although de-indexing of benefits did contribute to a decline in replacement 
rates and the regressive direction of tax cuts increased real wage dispersion. Various reforms sought to 
enhance activation, by tying receipt of welfare benefits to efforts to re-enter the labour market, most 
notably the Jobseekers Act of 1995, which introduced a number of job search requirements for the un-
employed. This implied a definitive move away from the insurance principle in unemployment support, 
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and a more rigid definition of active attempts to find work in allocating unemployment benefits (the 
Jobseekers’ Allowance) (Clasen 2005: 81). This built on the paring back of National Insurance as an ef-
fective supplementary tier of protection, which meant that most unemployed were already in receipt of 
means-tested benefits by the mid-1990s. 
There is some evidence to suggest that these policies were not as successful in job creation as 
the OECD initially claimed (Howell, Baker, Glyn and Schmitt 2007), but by the mid-1990s, the UK 
had low unemployment compared to the other large European economies, and relatively high employ-
ment (but also high levels of sickness benefit claimants, who do not figure in the unemployment sta-
tistics). However the British case also suggested a sharp trade-off between employment performance 
and social justice, as Britain experienced a dramatic increase in income inequality through the 1980s 
and the early 1990s (Jenkins 1996). The model emerging out of two decades of marketizing reforms 
fit closely with the logic of the liberal market economy (LME) type in the Varieties of Capitalism ap-
proach: low employment protection combined with limited welfare provision to generate a flexible 
labour market with wide wage dispersion and limited employer commitment to building collaborate 
relationships with employees. This model facilitated rapid firm adaptation to market change, and 
particularly suited the politically influential financial sector. However this was achieved at the price 
of exacerbating inequalities and the insecurity of a large part of the workforce, key concerns of the 
Labour party, which won election in 1997.
The election of the Labour government marked a change of approach of the area of welfare and 
labour market policy and represents an important test of the theories of institutional change outlined 
earlier. Labour was committed to tackling poverty and “social exclusion”, but was reluctant to upset 
employer interests (Hay 1997) and therefore committed itself to retaining many of the Thatcherite re-
forms, including those affecting trade unions. Its “third way” approach in effect embraced the logic of 
institutional persistence: Blair and Brown promised a “fair and flexible labour market”, and won elec-
tion on the commitment that the UK law would remain “the most restrictive on trade unions in the west-
ern world” (Taylor 2005: 293). There were pragmatic reasons for adopting this position: to win power, 
Labour had to offer something to its traditional constituency, hard hit by Thatcherite policies, but also 
reassure the middle class groups which had supported the Conservatives in the 1980s (Heath and Curtice 
2004), as well as heading off opposition from business elites. This set of circumstances set high barriers 
to formal revision of institutional arrangements, and incentivized working within the existing paradigm.
The Blair government also adopted a more pro-European tone than past British governments, 
including a commitment to the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty rejected by the Conservatives. 
But Europe was not a convenient source of cover for Labour, which faced a different dilemma to many 
other European governments: after Britain’s exit from the ERM, unemployment had fallen rapidly com-
pared with neighbouring countries, but poverty and inequality were much worse than in most of the rest 
of Western Europe. To this extent, the EES —which focused more on job creation than on anti-poverty 
measures— did not match Britain’s specific labour market concerns, and European pressures are not a 
plausible explanation of Labour policies in this area (Hopkin and van Wijnbergen 2011).
In practice, Labour aspired to resolve the poverty problem in part by encouraging and subsidizing 
greater participation in the labour market, so that the poor could improve their situation through paid 
work rather than increased government transfers. As Gordon Brown himself clearly stated, “the best 
form of welfare is work” (1999, cited in Sloam 2007). Labour’s welfare and labour market strategy 
consisted of a series of inter-related measures. The first move was in the area of active labour market 
policy: the “New Deal”, initially aimed at the young, and later extended to a variety of categories of the 
long-term unemployed. Claimants (those claiming benefits for 6 months, if under 25, and 18 out of the 
last 21 months, if older) are automatically enrolled on a “Gateway” period giving extensive job search 
assistance, involving training in job search and interview skills. Those failing to find work after this first 
stage were offered a choice of education, paid voluntary work or subsidized paid work. Withdrawal of 
benefit was possible if no such choice was made. The judicious combination of inducements and penal-
ties aimed to enhance employment and social cohesion without impeding the flexible and deregulated 
operation of the UK labour market.
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This constituted a major step in the direction of increasingly active, rather than passive, labour 
market policy in the UK, and there is some evidence that it made an impact (van Reenen 2003, Hirsch 
and Millar 2004). Subsequent reforms sought to enhance the activation potential of the services for the 
unemployed: in 2002, the existing Job Centres (where the unemployed registered for work opportuni-
ties) and Benefits Offices (where unemployment benefits were claimed) were merged into a new agency, 
Jobcentre Plus, aimed at intensifying support for job seeking. Various pilot schemes have involved 
private employment agencies being contracted by the government to place unemployed workers. These 
measures moved beyond simply deregulatory liberalization, focusing instead on creating institutions 
that would make the labour market clear more effectively.
Activation was quickly complemented with other measures to enhance incentives for excluded 
groups to enter the labour market. The most important was the introduction of “tax credits”, which sub-
sidized the income of low paid workers according to certain criteria to ensure a higher minimum income 
for families. These credits (Working Families Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit) were paid to families 
with children in order to overcome the “poverty trap” resulting from low-skilled workers being unable to 
earn enough in the labour market to compensate for the loss of social benefits on achieving employment. 
Complementary to these measures were moves to provide more widely available and affordable childcare 
facilities —in which Britain lagged badly behind most of the EU in the mid-1990— in order to encourage 
unemployed lone parents to take up paid employment. Finally, the introduction of a national statutory 
minimum wage in 1998 contributed to the increased attractiveness of employment for workers at the low-
wage end of the labour market. Other regulatory measures include extensions of maternity rights, rights 
to request flexible working times (Employment Act 2002), an enhancement of protection against unfair 
dismissal and a right to union recognition in all workplaces (Employment Relations Act 1999). 
In other words, Labour increased the regulatory burden on employers, and deployed a range of 
fiscal and welfare measures to enhance labour market opportunities for the unemployed and low paid 
workers. All of this amounted to a departure from the straightforward liberal logic of labour market 
and welfare policies in the 1980s and early 1990s. However this does not imply a reversal of the broad 
push towards liberalization observed by Baccaro and Howell (2011). These policies, despite making 
important changes to the labour market regime in the UK and having non-negligible distributive conse-
quences, remain consistent with the broad institutional arrangements of the LME entrenched under Mar-
garet Thatcher. The Labour government’s policy ideas followed the logic of LMEs: low taxes, flexible 
labour markets, and weak trade unions. As well as the “flexicurity” ideas of the EES, the Labour welfare 
strategy also drew on experiences from the archetypal LME, the United States, where “welfare to work” 
measures developed under Clinton (Dolowitz 2003) sought to make welfare provision consistent with 
the logic of a liberalized labour market. The well established activation measures in Scandinavia were 
introduced to policymakers by Labour party economics advisors such as Richard Layard, but they were 
not deployed with equivalent expenditures. This kind of policy response fitted in with the “third way” 
(Giddens 1998) approach adopted by Tony Blair, and could be built on top of the existing welfare regime 
architecture without challenge the liberal paradigm.
In this way the UK moved away from the dominant model of the early 1990s (articulated in the 
OECD’s 1994 Jobs Study), adding activation and further regulation, albeit with a “light touch” (Dav-
ies and Freedland 2007): Britain remains at the low end of the EPL scale and Labour ministers could 
still boast that Britain had “the most flexible labour market in Europe” (Nolan 2004). Labour chose to 
encourage rather than undermine the creation of “atypical” employment, as part of the “employment-
friendly” welfare strategy, although there was a further extension of temporary worker’s rights agreed 
with the trade unions in the 2004 Warwick agreement.
It is therefore not too much of a simplification to see current labour market arrangements in Brit-
ain as consistent with the logic of the LME model. Labour have maintained the flexible labour market 
and limited trade union involvement inherited from the Conservatives, and have sought to ameliorate the 
condition of the lowest paid workers and the unemployed through labour market activation and in-work 
social transfers. This policy mix was consistent with European-level initiatives, but European pressures 
probably did not take the Blair government very far from the goals it had set for itself in any case. The 
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high levels of labour mobility, part-time and temporary work, poverty and income inequality remaining 
after three legislatures of Labour government suggest that the LME logic was not fundamentally chal-
lenged by its reforms. The liberalization of the labour market under Thatcher was been complemented 
by state interventions which seek to enhance both social inclusion and labour market flexibility; for 
example by adapting the Jobseekers” Allowance to a more activation-oriented function, or the use of 
tax credits to enhance employment incentives without fundamentally altering the nature of the employ-
ment contract. This leaves Britain with a liberalized political economy, and a welfare state which works 
with the grain of the flexibile and mobile labour market, providing a safety net without challenging the 
growth of inequality.
V. Liberalization in a Statist Political Economy: Rigidity and Reform in Italy
Just as recent patterns of labour and welfare policy in UK have been tied to distinct periods of 
Conservative and then Labour government, the process of policy change in the Italian labour market 
has also been closely intertwined with the dynamics of political power. After the institutional turmoil 
at the basis of the transition from the “First” to the “Second” Republic in the early 1990s, including an 
electoral reform introducing a strong plurality component to the election of the Chamber of Deputies, 
in 1996 Romano Prodi’s Olive Tree (Ulivo) coalition formed the first government in post-war Italy to 
include ministers from the former communist left (Democratici di sinistra). Prodi’s government also 
rested on the parliamentary support of the radical left party Rifondazione Comunista. These develop-
ments have dual significance. First, the introduction of a majoritarian dynamic in party competition 
implied greater scope for policy change than in the deeply consensus-oriented politics of the “First 
Republic”. Second, the entry of the left into government would be expected to lead to policy changes 
in the area of welfare and labour markets. Prodi’s majority drew on two different traditions: a reformist 
left mixing social democratic and Christian democratic inspiration, and the left of communist identity, 
represented by the party of Rifondazione Comunista and by the biggest Italian union (CGIL - Confed-
erazione Generale Italiana dei Lavoratori, with almost 6 million members in 2008), hostile to liberal-
izing and deregulatory reforms. 
 The pressure for reform responded in part to political dynamics, in particular the end of the 
dominance of Christian Democracy in 1992-4, and its replacement on the centre-right of the party 
system by political forces far less sympathetic to worker protections, notably Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia and the Northern League. But reforms were also a response to objective deficiencies in the 
existing “conservative/corporatist” model, which was based on strong legal protection of the jobs of 
core workers, an emphasis on passive rather than active labour market measures, and a welfare system 
which tended to protect already protected workers, creating insider-outsider tensions and hindering 
labour market adjustments (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996). The Italian political economy that had 
developed by the early 1980s was characterized by a high degree of state interventionism, heavily 
regulated labour and product markets, and serious budgetary imbalances (Padoa-Schioppa Kostoris 
1993, Locke 1995). The financial crisis of the early 1990s, in which Italy came close to debt default 
and had to exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, was a trigger for a series of reforms. 
Although these reforms covered a range of areas, including the budgetary process, the organization 
of local and central government, and the financial sector, our attention here is focused on the labour 
market and welfare provision.
The first major labour market intervention of the Prodi government was the so-called “Treu pack-
age” (Law 196/1997 named the Labour Minister), which for the first time in Italy legalized temporary 
agency work (lavoro in affitto), previously a state monopoly. The legislation was a compromise between 
the commitment of the Olive Tree coalition to dismantle labour market rigidities and the demands of the 
communist left to tame flexibility with boundaries and restrictions in order to limit worker insecurity. 
Temporary work was allowed only for medium -and high-level qualifications in the industrial sector, and 
agencies could only operate within strict bureaucratic rules and conditions. However these restrictions 
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were gradually relaxed in the following years, as temporary agencies and contracts became widespread, 
allowing temporary work for all qualifications and economic sectors (including in the public administra-
tion). By 2008 there were 142,000 temporary workers, i.e. 0.6% of total employment; not a very high 
share but qualitatively important given its concentration in the industrial regions of the North (Bertolini, 
Berton and Pacelli 2009). 
Another important measure towards labour market liberalization was legislative decree no. 
469/1997, which radically reformed employment exchanges after 50 years of state monopoly. The 
provision combined the re-scaling of placement competencies with the legalization of private employ-
ment agencies and a new “activation” approach. Placement competencies were decentralized at the 
provincial level, private agencies (to be added to the agencies for temporary work) were allowed to act 
alongside state employment offices, and an attempt was made to introduce a “Scandinavian” approach 
to welfare-to-work and activation. This involved the introduction of conditionality rules and specific 
“client-agreements” (patto di servizio), according to which the office was committed to getting the 
unemployed back into the labour market as soon as possible, provided that the latter did not reject any 
offers of work or training. 
These two liberalizing reforms – the dismantling of state’s monopoly on placement and the intro-
duction of private labour market agencies on the one side and the decentralization and reorganization of 
public placement offices on the other – can be considered more than incremental change. A new logic of 
labour market regulation through the “assimilation” (Streeck and Thelen 2005) of Northern European 
practices (such as activation, coaching and tutoring, public-private competition, decentralization and 
localisation) implied a challenge to the logic of the existing hegemonic paradigm, based around high 
levels of employment protection and low labour mobility. The reforms sought to align the Italian em-
ployment services with the experience of the other European countries, in particular the Scandinavian 
countries and the United Kingdom (the 1996 Job Jobseekers’ Allowance proving particularly influen-
tial). They marked a move away from the rather bureaucratic logic of the post-war arrangements —
where employers were formally required to hire workers from employment agencies according to strict 
rank orders— towards a more flexible, market-oriented model.
However, there were difficulties and delays in implementing this new logic, not least of which 
was the difficulty in transforming the “old guard” of employment exchange bureaucrats into a more pro-
active service, and the relative scarcity of funds for the new service: spending on active labour market 
policy in Italy grew from 0.2% to 0.5% of GDP between 1995-2000, but this figure still placed Italy 
at the low end of the scale amongst advanced democracies (although slightly higher than in Britain; 
Rueda 2007: 75). Another constraint on reform was the Prodi government’s commitment to negotiat-
ing changes with the trade unions through “social concertation” (Rhodes 2001, Ferrera and Gualmini 
2004, Baccaro and Simoni 2008): the introduction of temporary work was anticipated in the “Pact for 
Work” signed by Prodi with the unions in September 1996, together with other innovative measures on 
long-life training and local development. But the unions were concerned to ensure that reforms did not 
undermine the protected position of their core membership, mostly older tenured workers in large firms. 
Trilateral agreements were facilitated by the “emergency” situation created by the risk of Italy’s 
budgetary problems keeping it out of the first wave of EMU. When this urgency began to subside, con-
certed action became a much less powerful tool for negotiating reform, and the last social pact signed 
by all the three most representative Italian unions with the centre-left government (Corregir D’Alema’s 
‘Christmas Pact’ of December 1998) had largely symbolic contents and did not result in any structural 
reform. In particular, the project of enhancing labour market flexibility by reducing employment protec-
tion, promoted by many labour economists and policy advisors, did not prosper, hindering the mobility 
effects of the Treu reforms (Tompson 2009: 260). The Italian trade unions, though much weaker than in 
the 1960s and 1970s, retained sufficient strength in this period to place limits on the liberalization agenda.
When in 2001 Berlusconi formed a centre-right government with a large parliamentary majority, 
the season of concerted action ended and labour market reform became more conflictual. In October 
2001 a White Paper (libro bianco) on labour market modernization was published, including the general 
framework of the reform going from the revision of labour law to the review of the whole range of active 
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and passive labour policies. The document drew openly on the newly developed European Employment 
Strategy. New forms of flexible labour contracts and a further privatization of placement services were 
announced in order to encourage the creation of new jobs, together with the revision of social shock 
absorbers, addressed to correct the dualism between the insiders and outsiders. 
In March 2003, some of the contents of the White Paper were included in a delegation law (no. 
30), which became known as the Biagi law, named after the Law Professor involved in its drafting who 
had been murdered by Red Brigade terrorists. In terms of labour contracts, the law introduced new 
contractual forms and revised others: new instruments of temporal flexibility included job-on-call, work 
vouchers, job sharing and staff leasing. Project work (collaborazioni a progetto) and occasional work 
(contratti occasionali) were already widespread in Italy (since 1995), but they were amended and re-
fined, including with some improvements in the social rights of employees. In the field of placement, the 
law widened the number of private actors who could deal with the matching of labour market demand 
and supply, from universities to single consultants, introducing free competition between public and 
private agencies. The Biagi law sparked intense political debate, partly unleashed by the government’s 
simultaneous proposal to repeal Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute (Statuto del Lavoro), which would 
remove workers’ rights to reinstatement as compensation for unfair dismissal. While the CGIL and the 
communist RC strongly opposed the reform for its “savage liberalization”, the DS and the Margherita 
(the two main parties of the Olive-tree), as well as the more centrist trade unions CISL and UIL, adopted 
a more conciliatory position, arguing that the number of flexible labour contracts was too high and that 
some of them (though it was not clear which ones) should be abolished. 
The main element of discontinuity introduced by the Berlusconi government concerned the rela-
tionships between the government and the social partners; instead of trilateral concerted action, the White 
Paper introduced the concept of “social dialogue”, which implied a weaker role for the social partners, 
and the possibility for the government to unilaterally decide in case of disagreement. Divisions among the 
three main national trade unions did not take long to emerge, with the CGIL expressing clear opposition, 
and the CISL and UIL adopting a more strategic and at times pro-government profile: the “Pact for Italy” 
of July 2002 and the later agreement on collective bargaining made with the third Berlusconi government 
in January 2009 were not signed by the CGIL. At the same time as the centre-right encouraged divisions 
within the trade union movement, it also won strong support from the peak national business association, 
Confindustria, and of employers in general who welcomed the reduction of burdens and constraints for 
companies. Confindustria in this period was under a new leadership, more favourable to the concerns of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, who embraced labour market deregulation. Large firms, more com-
fortable with the existing labour market regime, were less supportive of this strategy.
However, in its content the Biagi law in many respects showed a high degree of continuity with the 
previous reforms of the Olive Tree government. The Treu package already introduced a greater degree 
of flexibility (above all concerning employment contracts), and the Biagi law extended this, although 
through a less consensual process. The flexibility paradigm was imposed on top of the existing, more 
protectionist, labour market regime. The main features of this regime —a high degree of employment 
protection for core workers, and limited unemployment coverage— remained intact, hampering the 
effective operation of the flexibility reforms. The reforms probably had some employment-generating 
effects: in the period 1996-2001 the yearly job growth was 223,000; 145,000 in the period 2002-2005 
and 660,000 between 2006 and 2007 (Bertolini, Berton and Pacelli 2009), and in the same period the 
unemployment rate declined from 10,6% to 5,9% in 2007 (ISTAT, various years). However, it is not so 
clear that the reforms benefited the younger workers it was designed to ease into the labour market: the 
activity rate of population aged 15-24 decreased from 38.8% in 1995 to 32.5% in 2006, considerably 
lower than the EU average (Simoni 2010: 17).
Labour market liberalization in Italy has run up against a number of institutional constraints that 
have hindered its progress. The first is that the trade union movement, though much weakened, remains 
strong in the public sector and in large firms where workers benefit most from labour protection legisla-
tion. This has created an “insider-outsider” dynamic (Rueda 2007, Palier and Thelen 2008, Emmeneg-
ger, Hausermann, Palier and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011) which incentivizes governments to liberalize “at the 
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margin” whilst leaving protectionist institutions intact for the core workforce. Italy’s fiscal position 
makes it difficult to overcome resistance to liberalization, since there is no real fiscal room for manoeu-
vre to allow for extensions to unemployment compensation, which could ease the passage of reforms. 
The financial crisis from 2008 on did lead the Berlusconi government to introduce €8 billion of 
“supplementary social shock absorbers” (ammortizzatori sociali in deroga) for the unemployed work-
ers excluded from traditional unemployment compensation (temporary workers, the self-employed, and 
those working in companies with less than 15 employees). But this measure, which also drew on the 
European Social Fund, applied only to 2009-2010 and a full structural reform of unemployment com-
pensation was again postponed, despite bipartisan support for new arrangements. The other major social 
policy innovation of the crisis period —the so-called “social card” introduced in 2008— cannot be 
considered a “structural” or “radical” policy intervention, amounting to just €40 per month for one year, 
addressed to the poorest elderly and families (with 1.3 million beneficiaries).
In sum, liberalizing reforms spurred a transformative change in Italy, which gave the country a 
more markedly Anglo-Saxon profile; but this selective liberalization was designed to work alongside 
the dualistic Bismarckian model of welfare provision and labour regulation. The goal of deregulation of 
the labour market was shared by both the political coalitions, but reformers dodged the thorny but cru-
cial issue of reforming social expenditure, without which a liberalized labour market could not properly 
function. Differentials in social protection thus widened and are the basis of the growing inequalities 
discussed earlier. Italy has therefore combined liberalization with the maintenance of parts of the pre-ex-
isting model, which suffered from a lack of effective institutions to encourage competition and efficiency 
or protect social cohesion. The result is some distance away from being a liberal model like the UK or 
US, but the broad thrust of policy change has been a liberalizing direction, and the failure to progress on 
the provision of universal income replacement policy ensures that inequality and poverty remain high.
VI. Conclusion: Liberalization and Diversity
This article has provided an account of innovations and reforms in labour and welfare policy in 
Italy and the UK in the last 30 years, two national cases rarely examined together in comparative welfare 
studies. We have shown that the dominant trend in both countries has been towards greater liberalization 
of the labour market, which helps explain the increasingly unequal distribution of income in the same 
period. This supports the “common neoliberal trajectory” thesis of Baccaro and Howell (2011). 
However, these moves in a liberalizing direction do not amount to convergence on a neoliberal 
model, for two reasons. First, the very different institutional legacies of Italy and the UK continue to 
shape the way labour markets and the welfare state work, and interact with liberalizing measures in dif-
ferent ways. Second, at least to some extent the Italian and British models of liberalization have some 
elements in common with the “flexicurity” agenda of the European Employment Strategy, stressing the 
concepts of “conditionality” and “activation” to deal with problems of social exclusion, poverty and 
employability. The picture is therefore more nuanced than a simple focus on neoliberalism would per-
mit. However, our account shows that the “flexibility” trend has been stronger than the “security” trend, 
and that policy change has cumulatively moved both Italy and the UK toward a more liberal and less 
egalitarian model of labour relations and welfare.
In Italy the firm belief in the flexibility recipe, considered as an effective answer to low unem-
ployment and competitiveness, has pushed the political agenda in a liberal direction (with the support of 
trade unions during centre-left governments, and through unilateral policy making during centre-right 
governments which nurtured union divisions). But the instability inside the government coalitions, es-
pecially for the centre-left, the lack of fiscal room for manoeuvre, and entrenched opposition from the 
unions, have hindered any effort to go ahead with the reform of employment protection and unemploy-
ment compensation to extend flexibility to the core workforce. Ad hoc and temporary interventions were 
introduced for limited categories of outsiders but these innovations have not modified the functioning, 
the eligibility rules and the coverage of the old system. The bipartisan support for liberalization has al-
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lowed for a layering of liberal institutions on top of a Bismarckian and corporatist framework, a highly 
institutionalised dualistic system of social protection dating from the 1950s and 1960s. Flexibility “at 
the margin” has increased the inequalities between insiders and outsiders, and dismantled the Italian 
model of employment protection for many younger workers.
In the UK, two decades of radical reforms under the Conservative party weakened trade unions 
and collective bargaining, leaving in place a residual welfare state and a mobile, flexible and increas-
ingly polarized labour market, characterized by high levels of wage inequality. The Labour governments 
led by Blair and Brown made important changes to this model through strategies of partial re-coupling 
with the trade unions and of social policymaking aimed at correcting the most rooted inequalities among 
categories and to stimulate participation into the labour market. The Beveridgean universalistic system 
was amended by new rules for fighting social exclusion, like tax credits, statutory minimum wage and 
more rights for the workers in the workplaces. But evidence on wage and income inequality and poverty 
suggests that the fundamental logic of the labour market and social protection inherited from the Thatch-
er years has been revised but not overturned. The financial crisis since 2008 has placed heavy pressure 
on the more distributive institutions introduced by Labour, and current policy under the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat government moves firmly in a neoliberal direction.
The two countries have thus both undertaken important labour market reforms in the recent pe-
riod, which have led to them liberalizing labour markets and introducing stronger elements of condi-
tionality in the welfare regime. However we do present some evidence – particularly in the Italian case 
– that policy change was not solely in a neoliberal direction. The Biagi law, in particular, drew openly 
on the European Employment Strategy, and the role of European Monetary Union in hastening fiscal 
policy change in Italy is well documented (Dyson and Featherstone 1996, Ferrera and Gualmini 2004). 
Britain did not face the same kind of fiscal pressures, but UK policymakers did draw on the repertoire 
of policies in the EES, in part because the New Labour government under Blair lobbied hard to push 
for the “uploading” of policies consistent with his “third way” thinking (Hopkin and van Wijnbergen 
2011). Timid moves towards “activation” —the active labour market policies successfully pioneered by 
the Nordic countries— were made in both countries, but lacking the necessary supporting institutions, 
the result was some distance away from the “flexicurity” model advocated by European policymakers. 
Moreover, once Italy had achieved entry into the first phase of EMU and Blair’s difficulties over Iraq 
undermined his own European policy agenda, the symbolic appeal of supranational prescriptions such as 
the EES became much less powerful. So European pressures to adopt labour market reforms that would 
attenuate liberalization with strong measures of social compensation had only limited impact. 
In our view then, the dominant picture is one of continued liberalization in labour markets and wel-
fare institutions, but the persistence of diversity stemming from the two countries’ very different histories. 
Convergence around a pure neoliberal model is unlikely, because of the well-known inertia and stickiness 
of institutions governing labour and welfare, and the political appeal of more socially progressive policies. 
But where changes have taken place, these changes have tended to imply liberalization and greater role 
for markets, whilst reforms adopted to attenuate the social consequences of liberalization have had less 
powerful effects. The timing of liberalization and the “fit” of market reforms with existing institutions may 
differ, but the outcome remains that Italy and the UK have progressively dismantled the most egalitarian 
elements of their post-war settlements, and left in place an increasingly liberal model of welfare and work.
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